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CHAPTER II   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 2.1        Previous Research 
 
In a research, theoretical foundation needed to support theory to be tested. 
The theories that will be used are a previous research done by other researcher. 
This research is based on the results of previous studies that took the topic of the 
influence of family ownership, family aligned boards, and political connections on 
the implementation of corporate governance. The previous research referenced 
conducted by following research: 
1. Paulus Hadjiprayitno (2013) 
The topic of this study is the influence of structure ownership and good 
corporate governance on agency cost. The independent variables are structure 
ownership, good corporate governance and the dependent variable is agency 
cost. The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of corporate 
governance on agency cost. But the result of the study implicitly said that 
dominating family ownership has a bad influence on the application of 
corporate governance. The sample used in this study is non-financial industries 
with high regulated listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange 2012. The data analysis 
technique used is the multivariate regression analysis. The result is the 
proportion of independent board and the number of board meeting has negative 
effects on the agency cost that is proxied as assets turnover. 
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The current study and the prior study have a similarity as follows: 
1. Both research determining the effect of ownership structure toward 
implementation of GCG. 
However, the current study and the prior study have differences as follows: 
1.  In previous research using agency cost as dependent but for current 
research using good corporate governance as dependent variable. 
2. Previous research used non-financial firm as sample but current research 
use bank as sample. 
2. Emmanuelle Nys, Amine Tarazia, & Irwan Trinugroho (2013) 
 This topic of this study is political connections, bank deposits, and formal 
deposit insurance: Evidence from an emerging economy. This study investigates 
the impact of political connected banks on their ability to collect deposits under 
two different deposit insurance regimes. The variable independent used is political 
connection and dependent variable is supply and demand of funds.  The sample of 
this study is Indonesian banks listed on Financial Service Authority from 2002 to 
2008. The analysis technique used is TSLS procedure to simultaneously estimate 
the demand and supply of funds. The result is, regardless of their type (state-
owned or private entities), politically connected banks are able to attract deposits 
more easily than their non-connected counterparts. This result is implicitly said 
that politically connected banks have lower level of transparency because 
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transparency is not considered to be an added value due to having access to 
finance from political input. 
The current study and the prior study have similarities as follows: 
1. Using politically connected bank as an independent variable. 
2. Both researchers using purposive sampling. 
However, the current study and the prior study have differences as follows: 
1. Research sample period of prior study is 2002 to 2008 Indonesian banks 
but present study is 2014 to 2017 Indonesian banks listed in Financial 
Service Authority. 
2. The analysis technique used is simultaneous equations panel data model, 
however, current study use multiple regression analysis. 
3. Prior study used bank performance and cost of funding as de pendent 
variables, but current study use good corporate governance. 
3. Bayu Wirawan and Vera Dianty (2014) 
The topic of this study is the influence of family ownership, family aligned 
board, and political connections on GCG implementation. The purpose of this 
study was to determine the impact of family ownership, family aligned board and 
political connections on GCG implementation in non-financial companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012. The variable independents used were 
family ownership, family aligned board and political connections, and the 
dependent variable is good corporate governance. The sample used in this study 
was a politically connected non-financial company listed on the Indonesia Stock 
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Exchange in 2012. The data analysis technique used is multiple linear regressions. 
The sampling method is purposive sampling. The result of this study is family 
ownership and family aligned board has significant negative effect toward the 
implementation of GCG, in other hand political connection have positive effect 
toward the implementation of GCG. 
The current study and the prior study have similarities as follows: 
1. Both researcher using family ownership, family aligned board and political 
connections as independent variables and good corporate governance as 
the dependent variable. 
2. Both researchers using multiple regression analysis techniques. 
3. Both researchers using purposive sampling. 
However, the current study and the prior study have differences as follows: 
1. The period of this study is 2014 to 2017. 
2. The sample’s criteria used are different from the previous research criteria. 
3. Previous research used non-financial firm as sample but current research 
use bank as sample. 
4. Umi Muawanah (2014) 
The topic of this study is good corporate governance and family 
ownership. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether non-family 
owned bank and family-owned bank have difference in practice of GCG. The 
variable independent used is family ownership and the dependent variable is good 
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corporate governance. The sample used in this study was Bank Pembiayaan 
Rakyat Syariah, Bank Umum Syariah, and Unit Usaha Syariah. The data analysis 
technique used is analysis of mean differences and regression. The design of this 
study is embedded explanatory design that incorporates mail surveys with in 
depth interviews. The sampling method is purposive sampling. The result of this 
study is family owned bank has higher composite score average rather than non-
family-owned bank. 
The current study and the prior study have similarities as follows: 
1. Both researchers using family ownership as independent variable and good 
corporate governance as the dependent variable. 
2. Both researchers using composite score in good corporate governance 
assessment 
However, the current study and the prior study have differences as follows: 
1. The period of this study is 2014 to 2017. 
2. The sample used is different from the previous research criteria. 
3. Previous research used sharia banks yet current study used conventional 
banks 
4. Prior study use questionnaire as the method of collecting data but for 
current study using document or secondary data.
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5. Albert A. Cannella, Jr. Carla D. Jones, Michael C. Withers (2015) 
The topic of this study is family business versus lone-founder-controlled 
public corporations: Social identity theory and boards of directors between family 
companies and lone-founder companies in implementing corporate governance. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether family firm put their family 
member or their descendant in executive position such as board of director and 
board of commissioners. The independent variable used is family ownership and 
lone-founder firm and dependent variable is family aligned board. The sample 
used in this study was a publicly traded corporation between 1991 and 2006 in 
United States. Data analysis technique used generalized least squares (GLS) panel 
data regressions. The result of this study is family firm positively put family 
member or their descendant in executive position such as board of director and 
board of commissioners rather than put the independent parties in executive 
position. 
The current study and the prior study have similarities as follows: 
1. Using family firm or family ownership as an independent variable. 
However, the current study and the prior study have differences as follows: 
1. Prior study using generalized least squares (GLS) panel data regressions as 
data analysis techniques but this study using multiple linear regressions. 
2. Using family aligned board as a dependent variable, however, current 
study use good corporate governance as dependent variable. 
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5. Irwan Trinugroho, Bambang Sutopo, & Sylviana Maya Damayanti (2017) 
 The topic of this study is politically connected bank in Indonesia. The 
purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of being politically connected 
bank on the bank performance and cost of funding. The independent variable is 
politically connected bank and the dependent variables are bank performance and 
cost of funding. The sample used in this study was 89 Indonesian banks over the 
period of 2001-2008 and this research used secondary data through annual report. 
The data analysis technique used is multivariate analysis. The result provides 
evidence that politically connected banks are benefited by getting a lower cost of 
funding. 
The current study and the prior study have similarities as follows: 
1. Using politically connected bank as an independent variable. 
2. Both researchers using multiple regression analysis techniques. 
3. Both researchers using purposive sampling. 
However, the current study and the prior study have differences as follows: 
1. Research sample period of prior study is 2001 to 2008 Indonesian banks 
but present study is 2014 to 2017 Indonesian banks. 
2. Prior study used bank performance and cost of funding as independent 
variable, but current study use good corporate governance. 
6. Daniel Yudistya Wardhana (2018) 
The topic of this study is the influence of the family firm on the 
implementation of good corporate governance. The purpose of this study is to 
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investigate whether family businesses have influence toward the implementation 
of good corporate governance. The independent variable is family firm and 
dependent variable is good corporate governance. The sample used in this study 
was a family company in the province of Yogyakarta. This research used primary 
data with did observation. Data analysis techniques were used descriptive and 
quantitative and the sampling method is purposive sampling. The result of this 
research is family business do proper implementation of good corporate 
governance. 
The current study and the prior study have similarities as follows: 
1. Using family firm or family ownership as an independent variable. 
2. Using good corporate governance as a dependent variable. 
However, the current study and the prior study have differences as follows: 
1. Prior study using small medium enterprises (SMEs) as research object but 
current research use bank as the sample. 
2. Prior study use questionnaire as the method of collecting data but for this 
research using document or secondary data.
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Topic 
Political connections, bank 
deposits, and formal 
deposit insurance: 
Evidence from an 
emerging economy 
The Influence of Family 
Ownership, Family Aligned 
Board, and Political 
Connections to the 
Implementation of Corporate 
Governance 
Good Corporate 
Governance and Family 
Ownership 
Family- versus lone-
founder-controlled public 
corporations: Social 
identity theory and 
boards of directors 
Good Corporate 
Governance Practices in 
Family Business : A Case 
Study in Indonesia 
 
Research 
Purpose 
This study investigates the 
impact of political 
connected banks on their 
ability to collect deposits 
under two different deposit 
insurance regimes 
To find out  the influence of 
family ownership, Family 
Aligned Board, political 
connection toward the 
implementation of GCG 
To investigate  whether 
non-family owned bank 
and family-owned bank 
have differences in 
practice of GCG 
To find out the 
differences behave 
between family 
companies and lone-
founder companies in 
implementing corporate 
governance 
To find out  the influence 
of family business toward 
the implementation of 
GCG 
Dependent 
Variable 
  
Supply and demand of 
funds 
 
Good corporate governance 
 
Good corporate 
governance 
 
Good corporate 
governance 
 
Good corporate 
governance 
Independent 
Variable 
Political connection Family ownership, Family 
Aligned Board, political 
connection 
Family owned bank and 
non-family owned bank. 
Family companies and  
Lone-founder companies 
Family business or family 
ownership 
Sample Indonesian bank listed in 
Financial Service 
Non-Financial firm listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange 
Bank Pembiayaan 
Rakyat Syariah, Bank 
Publicly traded 
corporations between 
Small Business 
Enterprises in Yogyakarta 
Table 2.1 
SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS STUDY 
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              Source: Emmanuelle Nys, Amine Tarazia, & Irwan Trinugroho (2013), Bayu Wirawan & Vera Dianty (2014), Umi Muawanah 
(2014) Canella, Jones & Withers (2015), Daniel Yudistya Wardhana (2018) 
Authority 2002-2008 Umum Syariah, and Unit 
Usaha Syariah 
1991 and 2006 
Analysis 
Technique 
Mean differences and 
regression 
Multiple linear regression Analysis of mean 
differences and 
regression. 
Generalized least squares 
(GLS) panel data 
regressions  
Descriptive and 
Quantitative 
Data Secondary Secondary  Primary and secondary Secondary Primer 
Method of 
collecting data 
Document Document Questionnaire and  
Document 
Document Questionnaire 
 
Result 
The result is, regardless of 
their type (state-owned or 
private entities), politically 
connected banks are able 
to attract deposits more 
easily than their non-
connected counterparts.  
Family ownership, family 
aligned board has negative 
effect toward good corporate 
governance, and political 
connection has positive effect 
toward good corporate 
governance. 
Family owned bank has 
higher average composite 
score rather than non-
family-owned bank. 
 
Family firms are more 
likely to interlock with 
other family firms, select 
directors with more 
experience in family 
firms, and keep directors 
on their board longer 
rather than independent 
board. 
Family business (family 
ownership) has positive 
effect toward the 
implementation good 
corporate governance 
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2.2    Theoretical Basic 
 
The related literature is supporting and become the basic to achieve the 
objective of this study. This sub-chapter describe the theory linked about family 
ownership, family aligned board and political connection on the implementation 
of governance, as well as the theory put forward by experts. 
2.2.1  Corporate Governance 
The term of corporate governance (CG) was popularized by the Cadburry 
Committee in 1992. The Cadburry Committee defines corporate governance as a 
balancing system between the company's strengths to maintain its existence and 
its accountability to stakeholders (Zarkasyi, 2008). In addition, Sutedi (2006, 
p.175) stated that corporate governance is a set of rules that regulate the 
relationship between management (managers) of the company, shareholders, 
government, creditors, employees and other internal and external stakeholders 
related to rights and their obligations or in other words a system that regulates and 
controls the company and a system of relationships between stakeholders that is 
used to determine and control the direction of the company's strategy and 
performance. 
There are five basic principles used as guideline to implementing good 
corporate governance. The principles of good corporate governance according to 
(KNKG: 2004) are as follows: 
a. Transparency 
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1.  Banks must disclose information in a timely, adequate, clear, accurate and 
comparable and easily accessible to stakeholders accordingly with their 
rights. 
2.  Information that must be disclosed includes but not limited to the 
company's vision, mission, business objectives and strategies, condition 
of finance, composition and compensation of management, controlling 
shareholders, cross shareholding, executive officer, risk management, 
internal control and control systems, compliance status, systems and 
implementation of GCG and important events that can affect bank 
conditions.  
3.  The principle of openness adopted by banks does not reduce liability to 
fulfill the bank's secret provisions in accordance with regulations 
applicable laws, confidentiality of position, and personal rights. 
4.  Bank policies must be written and communicated to the party who have 
an interest (stakeholders) and who have the right to obtain information 
about the policy. 
b. Accountability 
1. Banks must establish clear responsibilities from each organizational organ 
that are aligned with the vision, mission, business objectives and company 
strategies. 
2. The bank must believe that all organs of the bank's organization have 
competencies in accordance with their responsibilities and understanding 
their role in the implementation of GCG. 
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3. The bank must ensure that there is an internal check and balance system 
bank management. 
4. Banks must have a measure of performance from all levels of the bank 
based agreed measures are consistent with the value of the company. 
c. Responsibility 
1. Bank relies on prudential banking practices and warrants the compliance 
with the applicable regulations. 
2. Bank as a good corporate citizen have to performed proper social 
responsibilities. 
d. Independency 
1. Bank keeps off the occurrence of improper domination by any 
stakeholders and not affected to partial interest as well as free from any 
conflict of interest. 
2. Bank will take objective decision and free of any pressures from any 
parties. 
e. Fairness 
1. Banks must always pay attention to the interests of all stakeholders based 
on the principle of equality and fairness (equal treatment). 
2.   Banks must provide opportunities for all stakeholders to provide input and 
express opinions for the interests of the bank and have access to 
information in accordance with the principle of openness. 
In order to create a good banking industry, Bank Indonesia (2006) issued a 
refinement of bank Indonesia regulation (PBI) concerning the assessment and 
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compliance of the quality of banking management. The improvement of the 
regulation was issued to prioritize the fulfillment of prudential banking principles 
and implementation GCG. 
Based on Bank Indonesia regulation No.13 / I / PBI / 2011 concerning level 
assessment health of commercial banks, it regulates that the implementation of 
GCG principles is one of the criteria used to assess the quality of the bank. The 
bank's GCG assessment is guided by Bank Indonesia Regulation No.8 / 4 / PBI / 
2006 concerning GCG implementation for commercial banks. The assessments is 
done independently (self-assessment) by comparing the fulfillment of each criteria 
or indicators with bank conditions based on relevant data and information. Based 
on the results of the analysis, each rank is set criteria or indicator. In order to 
ensure the five basic principles of GCG, banks are do self-assessment consist of 
11 assessments namely: 
1. Implementation of Commissioner’s Duties and Responsibilities 
The duties of commissioner are supervising on supervision policy, 
the course of the maintenance of the company by the board of directors 
and provide advice to the board of directors. Besides, the responsibilities 
of commissioner are providing feedback and approval of the work plan 
and the annual budget of the company and the company’s long-term work 
plan was prepared and submitted by the board of directors. 
2. Implementation of Director’s Duties and Responsibilities  
The board of directors is the visionary body for the chapter.  It is 
their responsibility to understand the practice of case management, 
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evaluate the needs of the membership, consider the resources of the 
chapter and develop the long term plan and the strategy to implement the 
plan.   
3. Completeness and Implementation of Committee Duties 
Within banking sector, there are committees needed to support the 
bank's performance in implementing corporate governance, 
namely internal audit unit; risk management unit and management 
committee risk, risk monitoring committee remuneration & nomination 
committee compliance unit. 
4. Handling Conflicts of Interest 
A conflict of interest is a situation in which a person or group of 
people or organization is involved in multiple interests, financial or 
otherwise, and serving one interest could involve working against another. 
It must be overcoming as soon as possible in order to mitigate the feasible 
risk. 
5. Application of Compliance Function. 
Compliance officers provide an in-house service that effectively 
supports business areas in their duty to comply with relevant laws and 
regulations and internal procedures. 
6. Implementation of the Internal Audit Function. 
The internal audit activity helps an organization accomplish its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and 
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improve the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance 
processes. 
7. Implementation of the External Audit Function. 
On the other hand, external auditors are professional in public 
practice expresses accountants an opinion whether financial statements are 
prepared, in accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework, 
such as an engagement conducted in accordance with International 
Standards on Auditing. 
8. Implementation of Risk Management Including the Internal Control 
System. 
Implementation of internal control system effectively that help the 
bank in maintaining assets, ensure the availability of accurate information 
and reporting, increasing the bank’s compliance to the rules and 
regulations in force, as well as reduce the risk of loss, fraud and violation 
of the principle of prudence. 
9. Provision of Funds to Related Parties and Provision of Funds Large 
Exposure. 
A bank may have exposures to a group of counterparties with 
dependencies that imply that they are all likely to fail simultaneously. In 
other words, this means that the group poses a single risk similar to that of 
a single counterparty. A key lesson from the financial crisis is that it is 
important for banks to consistently measure, aggregate, and control 
exposures to these counterparties. 
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10. Transparency of the Bank's Financial and Non-financial Conditions, 
Reports of GCG Implementation and Internal Reporting 
In order to attract and convince customers and investors in trust, 
banks are required to publish financial reports, annual reports and GCG 
reports regularly every year.  
11. Bank Strategic Plan 
In anticipation of the dynamics of changes in the external 
environment, banks need to always reviews its short, medium and long-
terms strategies as outlined in the form of Bank Business Plan (BBP) in 
order to keep exist and sustain banks life. 
2.2.2 The Objective of Good Corporate Governance 
 
The objectives of implementing the principles of good corporate 
governance are:  
1. Maximizing the value of the company in the form of performance 
improvements (high performance) and good corporate image.  
2. Encouraging professional, transparent and efficient management of the 
company and empowering functions and increasing the independence of 
the company's organs.  
3. Encouraging corporate organs to make decisions and carry out actions 
based on high ethical or moral values and compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations, as well as awareness of the company's social 
responsibility towards stakeholders. 
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4. Reducing the potential conflict of interest in the organs of the company 
and workers in running the business of the company.  
5. Creating a conductive business environment to achieve corporate 
objectives. 
2.2.3  Family Ownership 
 
Haque, Arun, dan Kirkpatrick (2011) conducted research in Bangladesh on 
the effects of concentrations of family-controlled company ownership and 
corporate political connection towards the implementation of corporate 
governance. The result is more concentrated family ownership in the company the 
greater the family's influence in giving a decision to place his family members as 
directors and commissioners in the company he controls. 
Siagian (2011) proves that empirically the level of ownership family has a 
negative influence on implementation of corporate governance because it avoids 
governance that tends to reduce control of the controlling shareholder in 
Indonesia. The research of Cynthia Afriani and Wahyu Jatmiko (2015) find that 
family-owned bank has greater credit losses than non-family-owned bank. 
A family firm is characterized by significant ownership of a single family 
and more than one family member and a person or family through a group, legal 
entity and companies. Canella, Jones, and Withers (2015) describe how family 
firm organizational identity greatly influences their governance choices. 
Specifically, family firms are more likely to select directors and commissioner 
with more experience in family firms, and keep directors on their boards longer 
(Canella et al, 2015).  
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2.2.4   Agency Theory and Family Ownership 
Agency theory is a theory that attempts to explain relationships and self-
interest in business organizations. It describes the relationship between principals 
or agents and delegation of control and explains how best to organize 
relationships in which one party (principal) determines the work and which 
another party (agent) performs or makes decisions on behalf of the principal 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1986). Agency issues do not only occur between 
shareholders and management, but also occur between majority shareholders and 
management with minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006).  
Banks with dominant family ownership which managed by their own 
family members would be trusted more, so agency conflicts are reduced (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, agency problems that arise are no longer 
between owners and management, but minority shareholders and also with family 
owners, which includes management from families. In the case the majority 
shareholder is family, so they have a tendency to maintain its dominance and 
status quo within the company, through its management and also restrictions on 
good corporate governance practices. 
2.2.5  Family Aligned Board 
 When a family owns a company, it will have a tendency to place a family 
member in the composition of the board of directors and the board of 
commissioners. Anderson and Reeb (2005) stated that there is a tendency for 
family companies to avoid having a board of commissioners from independent 
board to safe the interests of the family as the holder of control. The concentrated 
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ownership of the family has an influence on control in process determination of 
the board of commissioners and the board of directors. This is done to protect the 
interests of the controlling shareholder family.  
2.2.6 Political Connection 
 
According to Purwoto (2011), a company with political connections is a 
company that in certain ways has a political bond or strives for closeness with 
politicians or the government. Political connection is like a double-edged sword. 
It can increase or even endanger the value of the company. Fan et. al., (2007) in 
China shows that when political control is limited, the company's performance 
improves. This is happens when there is an increase in results in the flexibility of 
the company in terms of placement of labor and enforcement of more effective 
corporate governance mechanisms. Fan et al., (2007) reported the results of 
research that companies that have CEOs with political connections have a lower 
performance of about 37% compared to companies that do not have political 
connections when measured by their company's three-year stock return after the 
initial public offering (IPO). 
Faccio (2006) research shows that political connected companies have 
lower performance compared to companies that do not have political connections 
on an accounting basis. This is possible because when politicians channel 
resources to the intended company, it can lead to distortion of incentives, and 
misallocation of investment and increasing corruption. Faccio (2006) argued that 
political connections can increase firm value if it succeeds in revoking unfair 
economic rents at the expense of competitors and consumers. However, if all or 
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most of the value of the company is consumed by politicians and managers who 
are connected with the politicians then the shareholders will only get a little of the 
remaining available value and this is one of the agency problems. 
According to Faccio (2006,) this can be aided by the use of proper 
governance structure. Faccio (2006) stated that if the political connection as the 
main determinant of a distorted investment decision, it will result in a lower firm 
value if there is no political connection. Leuz and Oberholzer (2006) provide 
evidence that in Indonesia, companies that face difficulties in establishing 
relationships with new governments when their patrons fall from power causes 
these companies have low performance and then turn to foreign financing. 
Another advantage gained by companies with political connections is easier 
access to debt financing, lower taxes, and stronger market forces. 
In this issue, there is applied resource based theory. In this case, political 
connection could be considered as resource based for the bank. Being politically 
connected are valuable for firms as their connections may provide privileges such 
as prevent them from competition, could create industry entry to barrier , more 
likely to be bailed out and improve the access to resources.  
On the other side, however, it also can be argued that political connections 
could be a burden for a firm as the connections may create well-performed firms 
that dependent on favorable government policies. It causes them more susceptible 
to the political issues, political changes or regulatory reforms (Trinugroho et al, 
2017). 
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The company can be said to have political connections if at least one of 
them is the head of the company, the majority shareholder or their relatives have 
been or are currently serving as high-ranking state officials, parliamentarians, or 
ruling party administrators (Faccio, 2006). Preliminary research on political 
connection is about the relationship between the company and the authorities, one 
of research by Fisman (2001) who examined the value of political connections. 
The examples of the influence of political connections between companies and 
ruling parties are also reflected in America (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009). 
Another influence of corporate political connection is can increase the 
value of a company if through political connections can eliminate unfair economic 
rents. This needs to be supported by good governance so that the value of the 
company is not only intended for the interests of the owners and politicians who 
have relations.  
In Indonesia research on corporate political connections began in the 
Suharto era by Fisman (2001) which resulted in an influence from the company's 
political closeness with the authorities on the company's stock price. Other 
research in Indonesia related to corporate political connections is by Wulandari 
(2012) who discusses the influence of political connections and ownership 
structures on company performance. Her research result proves those companies 
who have political connection have worse performance compared to companies 
that do not have political connections. Purwoto (2011) also conducts research on 
political connection and blurring of financial statements with synchronization and 
risk of stock price crashes. The result is political connections will have an impact 
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on the availability of specific information on the company, and the companies 
tend to obscure specific information through quality reporting. 
2.2.7 Effects of Family Ownership on the Composition of the Board of 
Directors and the Board of Commissioners Affiliated with the Family 
 
According to Haque, Arun, and Kirkpatrick (2011), a company said has 
family-affiliated commissioners if the controlling shareholder is a family, then the 
family tends to have incentives and strength to obtain benefits for themselves in 
the form of excessive compensation, special relationship transactions for personal 
gain. The results of their study strengthen the research’s result by Fama and 
Jensen (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001). 
Haque, Arun, and Kirkpatrick (2011) stated that the companies that are dominated 
by family ownership directly give influence in the management of the company. 
Claessens et al. (2002) stated that 84.6% of managers in Indonesia were 
determined by the final control and the companies are more likely to take 
advantage of their control in expropriating minority shareholders through their 
chosen management. Anderson and Reeb (2005) state that there is a tendency for 
family companies to avoid having a board of commissioners from independent 
circles to safe the interests of the family as the holder control. Concentrated 
ownership of the family have an influence on control in the political process for 
the determination of the board of commissioners and the board of directors and 
this is done to protect the interests of the controlling shareholder which is family. 
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2.2.8 Effect of Family Ownership and Composition of the Board of    
Commissioners and Directors on the Implementation of Corporate 
Governance 
 
 Haque, Arun, and Kirkpatrick (2011) showed that there is a negative 
influence of the ownership structure and the political process of determining the 
board of commissioners and directors on the implementation of corporate 
governance in Bangladesh. The more directors and commissioners who are 
affiliated with the family, the decisions taken will be more gainful for the 
controlling shareholders but harm the minority shareholders. Siagian (2011) 
proved that in Indonesia empirically the level of family ownership has a negative 
influence on the implementation of corporate governance because it avoids 
governance that tends to reduce control from the controlling shareholders. 
2.2.9 Effect of Political Connection to the Implementation of Corporate          
Governance 
Vermonte (2012) stated that funding from political parties in Indonesia is 
not enough only from membership fees, parties also need other sources of funding 
from corporate or individual contributions that often involve the transactional 
agreement. The reciprocal form of the funder can be in the form of political 
lobbying, project tenders, or policies that are beneficial for the company or related 
individuals. Moreover, the company going to try to lobby politically to maintain 
the status quo in policies related to corporate governance in order to maintain 
control over minority shareholders. Micco, Panizza, and Yanet (2007) stated that 
companies with political connection have the possibility to make adjustments in 
financial reporting for the benefit of controlling shareholders so as to sacrifice 
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minority shareholders. Research from Bebchuk and Neeman (2005) shows that 
insider transactions in companies whose the ownership is concentrated in families 
use assets from the company for personal gain, one of the uses of company assets 
is to influence politicians and bureaucrats to maintain low investor protection. By 
investor protection that remains low, the controlling shareholders will be able to 
continue to use minority shareholders through expropriation. 
Besides the weakness of investor protection, the implementation of 
governance is also influenced by transparency from politically connected 
companies. Leuz and Gee (2006) have argued that political connections can be a 
substitute for loans from abroad. According to Leuz and Gee (2006) this 
substitution effect makes the level of transparency of the company worse because 
of the need to follow the reporting and transparency requirements in accordance 
with foreign financing standards. 
Politically connected companies will have low transparency and obtain 
debt financing due to their political connections. Politically connected companies 
will use their control to lobby politics so that standards, rules and enforcement of 
corporate governance remain in the status quo (Haque, Arun, and Kirkpatrick, 
2011).  
2.3 Research Framework 
 
Based on the explanation of the previous section, it can be made a link 
between family ownership, family aligned board, political connections, bank size 
as control variable and the implementation of corporate governance with the 
following framework: 
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Figure 2.1 
Research Framework 
 
2.4 Research Hypothesis 
 
In this study consisted of several research hypotheses as the initial 
reference in this study based on previous theories and research. 
H1: Family ownership has a negative effect on the implementation of good 
corporate governance. 
H2: The composition of the board of directors and the board of 
commissioners affiliated with the family within the company has a negative effect 
on the implementation of good corporate governance 
H3: Political connections have a significant effect on the implementation 
of good corporate governance
Family 
Ownership 
 
Family Aligned    
Board 
 
Political 
Connection 
Good Corporate 
Governance 
  (-) 
  (-) 
(-/+) 
Bank Size 
